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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
NORMAN ANDREW HAGA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Priority No. 2 
Case No. 960405-CA 
NATURE OF APPEAL AND STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals his convictions for theft, a second-degree felony, and 
burglary, a third-degree felony (R. 191-92). Defendant claims, on appeal, that the 
prosecutor committed misconduct and that his attorney provided constitutionally 
ineffective representation. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(e) (1996). . 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND REVIEW STANDARDS 
1. Did the prosecutor's comments "call to the jurors' attention matters which 
they would not be justified in considering in reaching a verdict" and, if so, did the 
comments prejudice the jury?1 State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 784-85 (Utah 1992). 
This Court determines de novo whether a prosecutor's comments run afoul of Emmett''s 
1
 This issue responds to defendant's Issues 1(A) and (B). Because defendant also claims 
ineffective assistance due to trial counsel's alleged failure to object to certain instances of prosecutorial 
misconduct (See, State's Point II, infra), this discussion also is relevant to defendant's Issues 11(A), (B), 
(C), and III. 
proscription. State v. Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287, 1290 (Utah App. 1994). The 
defendant must establish prejudice "in light of the totality of the evidence ... and 
circumstances of the case as a whole." State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750, 755 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied, 923 P.2d 693 (Utah 1996). 
2. Does defendant establish that trial counsel's alleged omissions fell below 
the standard of the reasonably prudent attorney and, therefore, undermine this Court's 
confidence in the verdict?2 When no evidentiary hearing has been held on a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court reviews the issue as a question of law. 
State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 175 (Utah App. 1992). 
3. Did the trial court have the authority to order defendant to pay restitution to 
the victim's insurance company? This ruling depends on the proper interpretation of a 
statute, which this Court reviews de novo. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 
1994) (the "appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any 
degree to the trial judge's determination of law."). 
RELEVANT PROVISIONS 
Any provisions pertinent to this case will be included in the text. 
2
 This issue specifically responds to defendants Points 11(A), (B), and (C), V, and VI. 
Ultimately, many of defendant's ineffective assistance challenges are resolved through the substantive 
analysis contained in the State's Point I, infra. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Procedural History 
On November 21, 1994, a jury convicted defendant of one count of burglary, a 
third-degree felony, and one count of theft, a second-degree felony (R. 60-61). 
Defendant filed an appeal on December 12, 1994, which this Court later dismissed 
without prejudice because the sentence had not yet been entered (R. 114; Case No. 
950007-CA). Because defendant had left the state and was incarcerated in Kansas on 
another charge, the trial court did not sentence him until May 20, 1996 (R. 191-92). In 
addition to the statutory prison terms for the felonies, to run concurrently, the trial 
court also imposed restitution in the amount of $13,630 and fines totaling $15,000 plus 
the 85 percent surcharge (id.). Defendant requested a restitution hearing and the court 
informed him he could have one (R. 315); nevertheless, no hearing was ever held. 
Statement of Facts 
On March 12,1994, a Saturday morning, Larry K. Olson, owner of the On and 
Off Roadhouse in South Salt Lake, stopped at his business to pick up some parts to take 
to Bountiful (R. 463). While there, he saw an early model Chevy truck, about 25- to 
30-feet away, which he had not seen before, parked next to Dee Leasing (R. 466, 479). 
Mr. Olson saw a logo on the truck's side, which he thought said "Custom 
Installations," though he later told the police it could have had something to do with 
insulation (R. 466, 343). Because the presence of the track bothered him, he tried to 
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get the license plate number, but the front plate was missing (R. 467). He was in a 
hurry to get to Bountiful and did not go around to check the rear plate (id.). Defendant 
saw the defendant standing next to the truck (R. 468). He was able to see facial 
characteristics, that he was a "smaller type individual" with a "receding hair line" (R. 
469). At all times, Mr. Olson "had eye-to-eye contact" with the defendant (id.). At 
trial, Mr. Olson could not remember whether he noticed defendant loading any boxes 
into the truck; however, Officer Tracy Tingey and Officer Dustin Hansen testified that 
immediately after the crime occurred, Mr. Olson told them that he saw defendant 
loading boxes (R. 477, 342, 447). 
Shortly after returning from Bountiful, Mr. Olson saw police in front of Dee 
Leasing (R. 473). He walked out to see what was going on and ended up giving a 
statement to the police, including a description of the person he saw by the truck (R. 
473). Mr. Olson described the person as a "white male adult, 36 to 38 years of age, 
light brown hair, bald, five-six to five-eight, about a hundred and fifty with a thin 
build" (R. 342-43). Officer Tingey, with South Salt Lake Police, later showed Mr. 
Olson a photo spread of several individuals and asked him whether any one of them 
was the person he saw at Dee Leasing the morning of the burglary (R. 474). Mr. 
Olson immediately knew which one it was, stating, "there was no question in my mind 
that this [defendant] was the individual" (R. 475). The photo spread was introduced as 
an exhibit (46-S) at trial (id.). When he made the identification, Mr. Olson also wrote 
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underneath defendant's picture that it was the person he saw loading boxes in the 
pickup (R. 447). 
In his investigation, Detective Hanson found that phone wires to Dee Leasing 
had been cut, automatically disabling the security alarm's capability to signal the police 
of a break-in (R. 336). As he walked through the building, Detective Hanson saw an 
upside-down styrofoam box in the middle of a narrow hallway (R. 345, 353). He 
kicked the box aside and stepped in fresh human feces (id.). 
Dee Leasing's owner, Donald Kaufer, went through his building and calculated 
that approximately $14,000 worth of equipment had been stolen or, in the case of 
doors, locks, and the burglar alarm, damaged (R. 454). Because the police believed 
the burglar was someone who knew the layout of the business and its contents, they 
read Mr. Kaufer the description of the suspect and asked him to think about anyone 
who might fit that description and also have been a customer or supplier (R. 554-555). 
In response, Mr. Kaufer said, "that sounds like Norm Haga," the defendant (R. 555). 
Mr. Haga had previously purchased computer supplies from Dee Leasing and 
approximately one year before the burglary had repaired a unique power supply on one 
of the computers (R. 547). Though the defendant repaired the supply in good fashion, 
Mr. Kaufer did not ask him to do more work because he had an "uncomfortable 
feeling" about him (R. 549). 
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Less than two months after the burglary, Officer Clayton Dumas was on routine 
patrol in West Valley when he saw a truck that fit the description of the pickup at the 
burglary scene (R. 524). The pickup was broken down, parked in Bevins Marine 
parking lot; the defendant, who admitted the truck was his, was working on it (id.). 
The pickup had some scratched lettering on the side and lettering that read 
"Intermountain Installers" (R. 525). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Prosecutorial Misconduct. The challenged remarks were not erroneous. 
Defendant's questions on cross-examination of the key alibi witness properly explored 
bias and motive to misrepresent. Additionally, the prosecutor also acted correctly when 
he asked the alibi witnesses about their reticence to come forward with their 
information before trial. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. Defendant's trial counsel did not give 
substandard performance. The comments defendant says his trial counsel should have 
objected to were not improper. Also, though defendant claims trial counsel erred by 
not requesting a continuance due to a discovery issue, trial counsel did, in fact, ask for 
a continuance. Consequently, defendant's factual premise is simply mistaken. 
Restitution to the Insurance Company. The State concedes that the trial court 
would not have had the authority to order restitution to the insurance company. 
However, the record does not indicate that restitution was actually ordered to 
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Travelers' Insurance. Indeed, the record is silent about any specific recipient of the 
restitution, leaving the impression that the victim would receive the money, if any is 
paid. Because the record is unclear on this point, and a restitution hearing is 
mandatory when requested, this issue should be remanded to the trial court for a 
hearing. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PROSECUTOR DID NOT BRING TO THE 
JURY'S ATTENTION MATERIAL THAT IT SHOULD 
NOT HAVE CONSIDERED; CONSEQUENTLY, THE 
PROSECUTOR DID NOT COMMIT MISCONDUCT. 
Defendant claims several instances of prosecutorial misconduct prejudiced his 
opportunity to obtain a fair verdict. Brief of Defendant at 12-21. Under the standard 
relevant to prosecutorial misconduct, to prove this claim the defendant must establish 
not only that the prosecutor provided the jury information "it would not be justified in 
considering in reaching a verdict," but also that, absent the improper information, it is 
reasonably likely a different verdict would have occurred. State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 
781, 784 (Utah 1992). 
Other jurisdictions have stated this law in various ways; these formulations 
illuminate in a nice way the hurdle over which defendant must jump for his claim to 
succeed. The United States Supreme Court directs it analysis to the fairness of the 
trial, adopting it as the "touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged 
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prosecutorial misconduct." Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 207, 219 (1982) ("the 
touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the 
fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor."). The federal high court 
specifically ruled that the "culpability of the prosecutor" is not the focus of analysis. 
Id. 
Similarly, the Colorado Supreme Court requires a showing that the alleged 
misconduct be so egregious that it "severely compromised a defendant's constitutional 
right to a fair trial." Harris v. People, 888 P.2d 259, 267 (Colo. 1995). In sync with 
this position are the courts of Minnesota, Iowa, and Ohio, "misconduct, viewed in light 
of the whole record [demands reversal only when it] appears to be inexcusable and so 
serious and prejudicial that defendant's right to a fair trial was denied." State v. 
Wahlberg, 296 N.W.2d 408, 420 (Minn. 1980); see also State v. Herrarte, 1997 WL 
458710, slip copy (Iowa App. 1997) (question on review is whether resulting prejudice 
prevents fair trial); State v. Staten, 470 N.E.2d 249, 256 (Ohio App. 1984) (whether 
misconduct was "egregious so as to deny [defendant] the fundamental right to a fair 
trial."). 
Here, defendant charges two instances of prosecutorial misconduct that, he 
argues, essentially denied him a fair trial.3 Defendant complains about the prosecutor's 
3
 Defendant asserts other, instances of misconduct, but he discusses (hem under the guise 
of ineffective assistance of counsel, due to the trial attorney's alleged omission to object to them. 
These events are discussed in Point II, infra. 
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examination of defendant's key alibi witness, Richard Perry. Brief of Defendant at 13. 
Mr. Perry owned a gas station, where he said defendant was working when the 
burglary occurred (R. 598). At one point during cross-examination, the prosecutor 
asked Mr. Perry if he had ever purchased other equipment or software from the 
defendant (R. 608-09). Trial counsel objected on the grounds of relevance, 
complaining also that the prosecutor was suggesting that defendant had sold Dee 
Leasing material to Mr. Perry (id.). 
Responding to this objection, the prosecutor told the trial court that his 
questioning went to motive. "If this person [defendant] is stealing computer 
components and software and then turning around and retailing them or wholesaling 
them or backdooring them to friends or associates or other people, that is a motive for 
theft. I'm trying to explore that with this individual" (R. 609). The trial court 
properly denied the objection, noting that he believeu n a relevant area of inquiry (id.). 
Evidence that defendant may have been selling stolen goods to Mr. Perry falls within 
rule 608(c), Utah Rules of Evidence, which allows questioning for impeachment 
purposes of a witnesses' "bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent." Utah 
R.Evid.608(c) (1997).4 Perry would have a motive to misrepresent the truth if he were 
4
 Only Utah's rules and the Military Rules of Evidence contain this specific provision, 
which was accidentally left out of the federal rules. 3 Jack Weinstein & Margaret Berger, Weinstein's 
Evidence, 608-168 (1994). However, the substance of the provision is, nevertheless, followed. Id; see 
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17 (1974) ("The partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at 
trial, and is always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony."). 
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obtaining stolen goods from the defendant. This potential motivation was properly 
explored. 
Defendant next claims prosecutorial misconduct based on the prosecutor's 
questions to Perry and other witnesses about their not coming forward as alibis before 
being called by the defense. Brief of Defendant at 18. Defendant cites to three cases 
from other states condemning this practice; however, there is no Utah authority on this 
issue and those cases have been expressly limited by their own courts. Defendant 
relies on People v. Kraai, 285 N.W.2d 309, 314-15 (Mich.App. 1979), which he says 
supports the argument that alibi witnesses should not be questioned regarding their 
failure to come forward before trial. However, several times since, the authoring court 
has specifically rejected the interpretation defendant seeks to give it. uKraai stands for 
the proposition that an alibi witness may not be discredited by insinuating his failure to 
be a good citizen based on his failure to come forward. It does not forbid such cross-
examination when good citizenship is not alluded to or suggested." People v. 
Lewis, 413 N.W.2d 48, 52 (Mich.App. 1987). 
Kraai concerned questioning of a alibi wimess who had learned about the 
defendant's whereabouts third-hand. Because of the indirect nature of this knowledge, 
the non-alibi wimess was not expected to come forward before trial. Id. Concerning 
alibi witnesses, the correct rule was stated in Michigan by a 1972 case, People v. 
McCkfw, 198 N.W.2d 707, 712 (Mich.App. 1972). There, the appellate court allowed 
cross-examination attacking an alibi wimess' failure to "speak or act when it would 
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have been natural to do so if the facts were in accordance with his testimony." Id.; see 
also, People v. Diaz, 296 N.W.2d 337 (1980).5 The alibi witnesses here are like those 
encountered in McClow, direct witnesses to the alibi and friends of the accused. Also, 
the prosecutor made it clear to the court and the jury that he was not alleging they had a 
duty to talk to the police (R. 606). 
New York law on the issue also is not as black-letter as defendant makes it 
appear. People v. Hamlin, 395 N.Y.S.2d 679, 680 (N.Y.App.Div. 1977) was a case in 
which the prosecutorial misconduct consisted not of the mere questioning of alibi 
witnesses but his suggestion that they were incredible simply because t;.y cooperated 
with the defendant, not with the government. Indeed, a later New York case, People v. 
Clark, 407 N.Y.S.2d 236, 237 (N.Y.App.Div. 1978) stated that inquiring about an 
alibi's failure to come forward "may be proper" if the jury knows that the alibi witness 
has no civic duty to do so. Further, two cases from Rhode Island specifically uphold it 
as a legitimate area of cross-examination. State v. D'Agostino, 691 A.2d 561, 562 
(R.I. 1997) ("purpose of state's cross-examination was to suggest that their alibi 
testimony had been recently fabricated. This was entirely proper."); State v. 
Gizzarelli, 651 A.2d 724, 725 (R.I. 1994) ("questions on cross-examination are 
9
 Another basis for the distinction between the McClow and Kraai standards is the direct 
or indirect knowledge of the purported alibi witness. Someone who learns about an "alibi" secondhand 
is not expected to have a "natural tendency" to come forward. People v. Perkins, 366 N.W.2d 94, 98 
(Mich.App. 1985). Similarly, a person with close personal ties to the accused also is expected to come 
forward; whereas a stranger may not face such an expectation. Id. 
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permissible to contradict or discredit a witness or to test the witness's memory or 
credibility."). 
Consequently, the defendant's questioning was not error, nor was it prejudicial. 
The prosecution's case was largely built on Mr. Olson's testimony of his observations 
and the circumstantial evidence, i.e., defendant's electronics expertise and his 
knowledge of the layout of Dee Leasing; defendant's possession of a white pickup 
matching the description. The alibi witnesses do not challenge any of these pieces of 
evidence; they only asserted that defendant could not have committed the crime because 
he was somewhere else. 
D. TRIAL COUNSEL'S NOT OBJECTING TO CERTAIN 
PROSECUTORIAL STATEMENTS OR SEEKING 
ANOTHER REMEDY TO AN ALLEGED DISCOVERY 
VIOLATION DID NOT CONSTITUTE INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
Defendant also complains about his trial counsel, alleging several instances of 
ineffective assistance. These concern purported failures to object to alleged 
prosecutorial misconduct, to seek a continuance for alleged discovery violations, and to 
bring in evidence that the Mr. Olson saw a picture of defendant before the trial. Brief 
of Defendant 21-38. 
Ineffective Assistance based on prosecutorial misconduct 
The standard for ineffective assistance claims has now reached the status of 
"hornbook law." An attorney has the constitutional responsibility to provide effective 
12 
representation, which means that he must act within the "wide range of competence 
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 
(1970). Phrased in the negative, as it usually is, an attorney provides ineffective 
assistance v. nen he provides representation below ihc standard of the reasonably 
prudent attorney and, but for that subpar performance, there is a reasonable probability 
the verdict would have been different. State v. Huggins, 920 P.2d 1195, 1199 (Utah 
App. 1996) ("'[a] reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.'") (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 
(1984)). 
Looked at from this perspective, none of defendant's claims support the charge 
of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, defendant complains about the victim's 
choice of the phrase "uncomfortable feeling" when the prosecutor asked him why he 
never asked defendant to do any more computer or electronics work for him. 
Prosecutor: Any reason why you would have stopped using 
him? 
Kaufer: Just kind of an uncomfortable feeling. 
Prosecutor: Why is that? 
Witness: I have been in business 28 years and 
you just get feelings about people. 
Prosecutor: Did he say anything personally to give 
you that feeling: 
13 
Witness: No, just an uncomfortable feeling. 
(R. 549). The prosecutor explained his reason for getting into this testimony during his 
closing argument when he suggested that defendant may have defecated in Dee Leasing 
because he was angry at never having received more work. 
Mr. Kaufer got a funny feeling about Mr. Haga. And I 
would suggest to you that it was that funny feeling that Mr. 
Haga also picked up because that's the reason ... that Mr. 
Haga defecated on the floor at Dee Leasing. This wasn't 
just a burglary and a theft. This was also a statement of 
screw you, basically. 
(R. 378-79). A prosecutor has "considerable latitude" to discuss his view of the 
evidence and the deductions from it. See, e.g., State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1223 
(Utah 1993). These statements do not exceed that latitude; instead, they are merely an 
attempt to tie-up a loose end in the case, i.e., the reason why defendant would have 
defecated on the floor. In any event, defendant does not suggest how this comment 
could undermine confidence in the verdict. Again, it does not attack either Mr. Olson's 
identification or the circumstantial evidence of defendant's guilt. Therefore, because 
the prosecutor's comment was not objectionable, defense counsel's failure to object was 
not ineffective. Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah 1983) ("The failure 
of counsel to make motions or objections which would be futile if raised does not 
constitute ineffective assistance."). 
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Defendant next challenges trial counsel's not objecting to the prosecutor's 
statement that "I have never seen a photo line-up as good as that one in terms of finding 
look-a-likes to Mr. Haga" (R. 372-73). He asserts that this remark improperly 
bolstered the identification by leading the jury to rely on the prosecutor's opinion. 
Brief of Defendant at 25. Defendant compares this comment to those the Utah 
Supreme Court condemned in State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475, 479 (Utah 1989). No 
comparison could be less apt. 
The prosecutor in Hopkins twice stated that he was "plainly impressed" by the 
weight of the evidence against the defendant.6 This is far different from the technical 
comment that the look-a-likes in the photo spread were similar. Most jurors probably 
did not even understand the legal context in which the prosecutor was speaking, i.e, the 
need to have similar looking individuals in a photo spread. Also unlike Hopkins, this 
comment was directed at only one piece of the evidence against the defendant, not the 
entire "weight of the evidence," with which the Hopkins prosecutor was so clearly 
impressed. This remark does not actually express the prosecutor's personal opinion 
about the defendant's guilt nor does it hint to the jury that other evidence of guilt is 
known to the State but withheld from the jury. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1,11 
(1985). It is more similar to a comment on a witness' credibility, which is appropriate 
* "Impressions that build to definite proof are nontransferable. It is impossible for me to 
convey in words in any capacity why the State is so impressed with the evidence in this case." Hopkins, 
782 P.2d at 479 (emphasis in original). 
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in closing argument. State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, n.15 (Utah App. 1992), cert, 
denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). Due to the propriety of this comment, the trial 
counsel did not provide ineffective assistance in not objecting. See, Codianna, 660 
P.2datll09. 
Defendant challenges trial counsel's decision not to object when the prosecutor 
stated, in closing argument, "[a] common ploy of defense attorneys is to try to discredit 
the victim" (R. 419). Brief of Defendant at 26. He misleadingly compares this to the 
comment of a prosecutor in United States v. Friedman, 909 F.2d 705, 709 (2d. Cir. 
1990), which the circuit court of appeals roundly condemned. The Friedman comment 
was far more damaging than the mere phrase "common ploy." "While some people ... 
go out and investigate drug dealers and prosecute drug dealers and try to see them 
brought to justice, there are others who defend them, try to get them off, perhaps even 
for high fees." Friedman, 909 F.2d at 709. The Second Circuit flayed the prosecutor 
for this remark, stating that, "in one breath [the prosecutor managed] to undermine the 
presumption of innocence, the Government's obligation to prove guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and the standards of propriety applicable to public prosecutors." Id. 
Contrary to defendant's argument, the "common ploy" statement cannot justly 
be compared either with Friedman or the prosecutor's comments in United States v. 
Rios, 611 F.2d 1335,1342 (10th Cir. 1979) where the attorney for the government 
asserted that the witness had "contrived" his testimony with the defendant's 
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investigator. This too was a gross breach of proper conduct, which was objectionable 
and prejudicial because it diverted the jury's attention from the trial of the defendant to 
atrial of the investigator/attorney. Id. Here, on the other hand, the clear purpose of 
the prosecutor's comment was to focus the jury's attention to the weakness of the 
defendant's case, i.e., its need to attack the victim's accounting of his losses. This was 
not such a blatant and potentially damaging comment that the trial attorney was 
required to object, even if it would have been legally proper to do so. 
Defendant complains that, cumulatively, the prosecutor's misconduct prejudiced 
the defendant. Essentially, this is a "cumulative error" argument, which requires 
reversal only if the "effect of the several errors undermines [confidence] ... that a fair 
trial was had." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993). The essential 
predicate for "cumulative error" is at least two non-reversible errors. Otherwise, the 
doctrine does not even apply. Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 530 (Utah 1994). 
Because defendant fails to establish any errors, that predicate is not fulfilled and the 
cumulative error doctrine does not operate to mandate reversal. 
Ineffective assistance based on failure to request continuance 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel erred when he did not ask for a 
continuance in light of the State's purported failure to provide all the discovery he 
needed. Factually, defendant's premise is simply wrong. Trial counsel did ask for a 
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continuance for this reason (R. 401).7 The trial court simply denied the motion. 
Defendant makes no claim of plain error on appeal. 
Ineffective assistance based on eyewitness identification 
Finally, defendant charges his attorney with subpar representation because he did 
not apprise the jury that Mr. Olson had seen a picture of the defendant before the 
preliminary hearing. He asserts this information should have been given to the jury to 
cast doubt on the in-court identification or to exclude it altogether.8 However, by the 
time the police sent defendant a picture of the defendant, Mr. Olson already had 
identified defendant as the burglar. On the photospread, Mr. Olson also had written 
underneath defendant's picture that it was the man he had seen loading the pickup. 
In essence, defendant asserts that Mr. Olson's recollection of defendant was 
improperly "refreshed" by the picture the police sent him of Mr. Haga before the 
preliminary hearing.9 However, it would be far more correct to say that his 
recollection was "refreshed," if that is even the correct term, not by the picture for the 
pipe bomb episode but the photospread the prosecutor presented to him during his 
7
 "I personally asked Judge Sawaya that we have a recess for whatever - continuance so 
we could send a C.P.A. firm in. And we came in and talked about the fact that we wanted to get the 
trial finished and my motion was denied. But I asked for mat" (R. 401, statement of trial counsel). 
* Defendant does not, and cannot, assert that the photospread identification was, thereby 
corrupted. The chronology is plain that Mr. Olson saw the photospread and picked out defendant's 
picture before he was presented with a picture of the defendant before trial. 
9
 The police sent Mr. Olson the picture because someone had rigged a pipe bomb to the 
door of his business and defendant was a suspect (R. 297). 
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testimony. This was the same photospread on which Mr. Olson wrote his identification 
of the defendant. The prosecutor showed this photospread (exhibit 46-S) to Mr. Olson 
before he made the in-court identification. Defendant never complains, even under an 
ineffective assistance analysis, about this identification chronology. 
The actual in-court identification is in accord with State v. Thamer, 111 P.2d 
432, 435 (Utah 1989). The photospread had pictures of eight people, all who had very 
similar facial characteristics. The police did not suggest that any one of those photos 
was of the defendant (R. 476).10 Mr. Olson had seen the burglar for at least a minute, 
was able to see facial characteristics, was certain in the identification, and made the 
photospread identification only two months after the crime (See, Statement of Facts, 
supra.). This complies with Thamefs requirements and, therefore, provided no 
legitimate ground for a defense objection. 
ffl. BECAUSE IT IS UNCLEAR FROM THE RECORD 
WHETHER THE RESTITUTION IS SUPPOSED TO 
GO TO THE INSURANCE COMPANY. AND 
BECAUSE AN INSURANCE COMPANY IS NOT A 
VICTIM FOR RESTITUTION PURPOSES, THE 
QUESTION OF RESTITUTION SHOULD BE 
REMANDED FOR A HEARING. 
Defendant correctly points out that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
201(4)(a)(i) (1995), an insurance company is not a victim for restitution purposes when 
10
 When asked if Officer Tingey made any such suggestions, Mr. Olson stated, "No, he 
did not. He said that it [the burglar] might not even be in here" (R 476). 
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its loss is merely due to reimbursement to a victim-insured. Under subsection 4(a)(i), 
"victim" has the same meaning as the word is given in the Victims' Rights Act, Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-38-2(9)(a) (Supp. 1997), which defines a victim as a person against 
whom the crime is committed. The crime here was not committed against Travelers' 
Insurance, but against Donald Kaufer. Therefore, defendant is correct when he states 
that the insurance company is not entitled to a judgment of restitution under subsection 
76-3-201(4)(a)(i). 
However, nowhere in the record does the trial court specifically order that the 
restitution be paid to the insurance company. Indeed, the judgment and commitment 
lists no recipient (R. 191-92). Accordingly, it should be assumed that the victim, Mr. 
Kaufer, will collect any restitution defendant pays. At that point, the actual right to the 
collection would become a civil matter between Mr. Kaufer and his insurance 
company. 
At sentencing, defendant did request a restitution hearing; nevertheless, he never 
pursued the matter. In order to determine the propriety of restitution under subsection 
76-3-201 (4)(e), this issue should be remanded to the trial court to hold the mandatory 
hearing. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant's convictions should be affirmed; the issue of restitution, however, 
should be remanded so that a hearing under subsection 76-3-201 (4)(e) can be 
conducted. 
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